This paper investigates how the level of competition affects diversification and stability using a sample of 978 banks in 55 emerging and developing countries over an eight year period 2000-2007. We shed further light on the competition-stability nexus by examining the complex interaction between three key variables: the degree of bank market power, diversification and stability. The core finding is that competition increases stability as diversification across and within both interest and non-interest income generating activities of banks increases. Our analysis identifies revenue diversification as a channel through which competition affects bank insolvency risk in emerging countries. The results are robust to an array of controls including alternative methodology, variable specifications and the regulatory environments that banks operate in.
Introduction
Competition in banking is important for the efficient production of financial services, the quality of financial products and the degree of financial innovation (Claessens and Laeven, 2004) . In addition the literature has identified six reasons why competition in the financial sector is important: firstly, for firms and households to access financial services (Beck et al., 2004) , secondly, for proper functioning of the financial sector (Claessens and Laeven, 2005) , thirdly, for stability of the financial system (Boyd et al., 2004) , fourthly, for efficient management of financial intermediaries (Berger and Hannan, 1989) , fifthly, for improvement of monetary policy transmission through the interbank market rates (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2008) , and finally, for overall industrial and economic growth (Allen and Gale, 2004) .
While the debate on whether competition influences bank stability continues (Berger et al., 2009) , the question of why competition should have a soundness-enhancing effect remains a relatively unexplored area. In this paper, we examine the mechanisms through which competition impacts bank stability. Vives (2011) reveals two basic channels through which competition affects stability. The first of these channels is that competition increases instability by exacerbating the coordination problem of depositors on the liability side and fostering bank runs which may be systemic in nature. The second is by increasing the incentive to take on more risk on either side of the balance sheet and thereby raising probabilities of failure. The 2007 financial crisis has also identified bank funding structure and financial innovation in bank activities as potential sources through which competition may affect stability (OECD, 2010) . Equally, financial instruments such as loans sales, credit default swaps and derivatives have turned out to be important sources of instability in the financial sector.
Both Turk-Ariss (2010) and Schaeck and Cihak (2010b) focus on bank efficiency as a possible conduit through which competition influences bank soundness. Tabak et al. (2012) argue that bank size and capitalization are the essential factors that explain the relationship between competition and the risk-taking behaviour of banks. Beck et al. (2013) however,
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suggest that an increase in competition will have a larger impact on banks' fragility in countries with stricter activity restrictions, lower systemic fragility, better developed stock exchanges, more generous deposit insurance and more effective systems of credit information sharing. Our paper contends that competition pressurises banks to adopt strategies to diversify and this decision affects bank insolvency risk. Apart from changes in the competitive environment that trigger banks to diversify their activities Gardener and Molyneux (1990) , other drivers that cause banks to diversify include: a hedging strategy (Froot and Stein, 1998) ; a mechanism to improve profitability and operational efficiency (Landskroner et al., 2005) ; reinforcing the function of banks as delegated monitors (Baele et al., 2007) . Despite these reasons, the impact of diversification on bank insolvency risk has been mixed. Stiroh (2004) , Hirtle and Stiroh (2007) and Mercieca et al. (2007) find no benefits for diversification. On the contrary, researchers such as (Landskroner et al., 2005; Baele et al., 2007; Sanya and Wolfe, 2011) reveal that diversification increases bank stability. Though the above arguments present a sound theoretical and empirical underpinning of the relationship between competition, diversification and stability, to the best of our knowledge this paper will be the first to investigate the role of diversification in the competition-stability relationship employing a panel dataset for banks in emerging economies.
This paper contributes to literature, especially on emerging/developing economies, by identifying the significance of diversification for the relationship between competition and stability. Three stage least squares (3SLS) is employed to simultaneously analyse the effect of diversification on competition and stability. The Lerner index is used as a measure of banking competition, while revenue diversification is measured by constructing Herfindahl Hirschman Indices (HHI) for each bank. This measure accounts for diversification between banks' major activities: net-interest income and non-interest income. On bank stability measures, Z-score (log); risk adjusted profits; bank capitalization level; and the ratios of non-performing loans to total gross loans are used. Z-score is used as a measure of overall bank insolvency risk; risk adjusted profit is used as a measure of profitability; the volume of non-performing loans to total gross loans measures bank loan portfolio risk; and finally the equity capital to asset ratio accounts for the bank capitalization level.
Our results show that competition increases bank stability. This is because banks make decisions to diversify their portfolio in response to the competitive environment in which they operate. Furthermore, the results show that competition not only improves stability, it also enhances bank performance measured by risk adjusted return on both assets and on equity (RAROE). More importantly, these relationships hold when non-performing loans ratio and bank capitalization are used as measures of stability. On contestability, the results reveal that the regulatory initiative that requires high regulatory capital and protects property rights reduces insolvency risk. The overall contribution of this paper is that it shows empirically that competition increases bank stability, and that the effect is due to the decision that banks make to diversify their portfolios in response to the competitive environment in which they operate.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews both theoretical and empirical arguments on the relationship between banking sector competition, diversification, and stability, Section 3 specifies the measurement and construction of the key variables, data and econometric specifications, Section 4 discusses and presents the empirical results, and finally, Section 5 concludes.
Related literature
The theoretical literature on the link between competition and stability is inconclusive. On one hand competition in banking has been shown to improve stability. On the other hand theory suggests it adversely affects banking stability. Those who support the 'competition-fragility view' suggest that monopolistic banks operating in uncompetitive banking systems may enhance profits and reduce financial fragility by maintaining higher levels of capital that protects them from external economic and liquidity shocks. A bank with more market power enjoys higher profits and has more to lose if it takes on more risk. Keeley (1990) and Hellman et al. (2000) provide the socalled 'franchise value' hypothesis and argue that as a higher franchise value will result in higher opportunity costs when bankruptcy occurs, bank managers as well as shareholders may not accept risky investments that could affect the stability of the firm and thereby jeopardise their future earning streams. Matutes and Vives (2000) develop an imperfect competition model where banks are differentiated, have limited liability and experience social costs of failure. Furthermore, Boot and Thakor (2000) suggest that because large banks tend to engage in credit rationing, they have fewer, but higher quality credit investments which enhance their financial soundness. Besides, market power in the banking sector could lead to higher quality of loan portfolios, improved capital allocation and thus maximise economic growth. Cetorelli and Peretto (2000) suggests that increased concentration in the banking sector and a reduction in information asymmetry gives banks the opportunity to screen and differentiate between low and high quality borrowers.
The proponents of the 'competition-stability view' on the other hand, argue that larger banks are often more likely to receive public guarantees and thus, are inefficiently managed and likely to fail. Under Mishkin (1999) , the so-called 'toobig-to-fail' concept posits that as banks become too large, the moral hazard problem becomes more severe for the manager who takes on risky investments with the knowledge of being protected under the government's safety net. Moreover, the higher loan rates charged by monopolistic banks may induce borrowers to take on risky investments to compensate for higher loan repayments. Thus, the likelihood of loan defaults may increase and induce a higher probability of bank failure (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005) . It is argued that a bank's size is associated with organisational complexity making it difficult to manage efficiently. Moreover, size allows banks to expand across multiple geographical markets, business lines and complex financial instruments which can be detrimental to their stability.
The empirical literature on the relationship between competition and banking system stability has revealed ambiguous results. De Nicolo et al. (2004) show that a higher level of systemic risk is positively associated with a concentrated banking system. Similarly, De Nicolo and Loukoianova (2006) find a positive and significant relationship between bank concentration and bank risk of failure. The result is even stronger when bank ownership is controlled and strongest when state-owned banks have sizeable market share. Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) find a negative relationship between bank concentration and financial soundness. In contrast to the above empirical literature, Beck et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence that suggests that increased banking concentration does not result in higher banking system fragility. Schaeck et al. (2009) , find evidence for the trade-off between competition and banks' risk-taking behaviour. Their study reveals that banks hold higher capital buffers when operating in a more competitive environment and competitive banking systems are less prone to experience systemic crisis. Berger et al. (2009) find support for the 'two views': on the competition-stability view, their study reveals that banks with a higher degree of market power bear significantly more loan portfolio risk; and on the competition-fragility view, their findings suggest that banks with more market power have less overall risk exposure. Boyd et al. (2009) find that banks' probability of failure is positively and significantly related to concentration. Carletti et al. (2007) reveal that merged banks decrease their reserve because of diversification effect and that merger affects loan market competition, which in turn modifies the distribution of bank sizes and liquidity needs. On the relationship between competition and capitalization level, Schaeck and Cihak (2010a) and Allen et al. (2005) show that when credit markets are competitive, market discipline emanating from the asset side induces banks to hold positive levels of capital as a way to commit to monitor and attract borrowers. In sum, the empirical literature on the competition-stability relationship is silent on the channel through which banking sector competition affects stability. This gap is what our paper addresses. We argue that diversification strategy is the conduit through which competition makes banks more financially sound.
Data and methodology

Construction of variables
Competitive indicators
We employ the Lerner index as a measure of competition for the sample. The index provides a direct measure of the degree of market power as it represents the mark-up of price over marginal cost. It is the only measure of competition according to (Berger et al., 2009) calculated at the bank level as:
where Price it is the price of total assets. MC it is the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of output. The MC it are derived from the translog cost function as:
where Cost is the bank's total costs including financial and operating cost; Q it represents a proxy for bank output measured as total assets, and W 1 , W 2 and W 3 indicate the input price of deposit funds, labour and capital and these are respectively calculated as the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and money market funds, labour cost to total assets, and other operating expenses to total assets. The cost function is estimated separately using a panel data for each country in the sample. This allows for the parameters of the cost function to vary from one country to another, reflecting different technologies. Once the cost function is estimated, marginal cost is evaluated by taking the first derivative with respect to the output for each bank in the sample. Hence, the marginal cost is calculated for each bank as:
The Lerner index is interpreted as follows: an index with a higher value implies higher pricing power and less competitive market conditions.
Diversification measures
In line with Mercieca et al. (2007) revenue diversification is measured by constructing Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for each bank. This measure accounts for diversification between major activities. HHI (REV) for each bank is calculated as:
where NETOP = NON + NET. NON represents non-interest income; net-interest income is captured by NET; and NETOP accounts for net-operating income. Eq. (4) is interpreted as: a rise in HHI shows an increase in revenue concentration and less diversification. This process is repeated for the construction of diversification within noninterest activities:
where
Where COM stands for revenue arising from commission income. TRD represents trading income and OTOP captures other operating income. Higher values of both HHI (REV) and HHI (NON) indicate greater concentration.
Insolvency risk measures
Z-score measures the number of standard deviations that a bank's profit must fall to drive it into insolvency. The index potentially measures the accounting distance to default for a given institution and it is calculated as:
where ROA is the rate of return on assets of a bank, E/TA represents bank equity as a percentage of total assets and σROA is the standard deviation of return on assets. The bank stability indicator increases with higher profitability and capitalization levels, and decreases with unstable earnings reflected by a higher standard deviation of return on assets. Thus from an economic point of view, the Z-score initially measures the probability of a bank becoming insolvent when the value of assets falls below the value of debt. This means that a higher (lower) Z-score implies a lower (higher) probability of insolvency risk. To improve the regression's goodness of fit and to reduce possible simultaneous bias the values of Z-score are logged. Additionally, we use bank-specific data to calculate the two risk adjusted performance measures of return on assets (RAROA) and return on equity (RAROE) by dividing ROA and ROE by their respective standard deviation (σ) as:
where ROA is the ratio of income before tax to total assets and ROE is calculated as net income divided by total equity. The ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans is used to proxy for loan portfolio risk. The use of bad loans as a proxy for loan portfolio risk takes into account: (i) the risk should not imply a higher risk of bank failure if the asset allocation tilts towards a larger holding of risk free assets and (ii) the measures at best should capture the default risk related to the loan portfolio. For the purpose of this paper, the measures of loan quality have an independent effect in so far as they relate to the probability of borrower failure to honour obligations and that a higher value indicates a riskier loan portfolio. It is calculated as non-performing loans to total loans.
Capitalization ratio is used as a proxy for bank stability because the 1998 Basel Accord has made banks increasingly focus on managing their capital base as a buffer against default. Martin (1977) also argues that the default risk of banks is directly related to the risk inherent in a bank's asset portfolio and its capitalization. Allen et al. (2005) on their part build a model to show that bank equity capital is higher in competitive credit markets, where, in their opinion, good lending opportunities are scarce. Bank capitalization level is measured as the ratio of equity capital to total assets where a higher ratio indicates lower bank insolvency risk.
We also control for variables that affect competition, diversification and stability. The ratio of total loans to total assets (loan/asset) explores banks' investment mix and it is calculated as total loans divided by total assets. Deposits to total liability ratio (deposit/liability) is used as a measure of funding structure and liquidity sources of banks. Following Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) who examine the effect of funding strategy on bank risk behaviour, the bank funding structure is measured as total deposits as a percentage of total liabilities. Return on Assets (ROA) measures bank performance in terms of the ability to generate profits after considering operating expenses. Thus it takes into account operating income and expenses. ROA is calculated as profit before tax as a percentage of total assets. Financial liberalisation index is a database constructed by Abiad et al. (2010) that recognises the multi-faceted nature of financial reform and records financial policy changes along seven different dimensions. The liberalisation index measures financial reforms that have taken place during the period and it ranges from 0 to 21 with the highest score indicating fully reformed. Capitalization index measures overall capital stringency and it has been found to reduce bank insolvency risk (Behr et al., 2010) . Capitalization index ranges from 0 to 9, with a higher value indicating greater stringency. Supervisory power measures whether the authorities have the power to take specific action to correct and prevent problems. It also ranges from 0 to 16 with higher values indicating more supervisory power. Property rights measure the degree to which a country's laws protect private property rights and the degree to which government enforces those laws. It is an index from the Heritage Foundation and it is scaled from 0 to 100 with higher values indicating greater freedom and legal property protection rights, respectively. GDP growth is used to control for the general economic development, macroeconomic stability, and institutional framework as these are likely to affect banking system performance in a country. GDP growth is measured as the annual rate of growth of GDP. Inflation is measured as the annual growth rate of the CPI index.
Data sources
This paper employs both micro bank-level and macro country-level data. Bank level data is taken from the most recent Bankscope database. All data are reported in US dollars and are expressed in constant prices where appropriate. As the study focuses on bank intermediation, we limit the empirical analysis to the unconsolidated statement of banks. These selections enable us to reduce the possibility of introducing aggregation bias into the results. The sample includes all commercial banks, cooperative banks, development banks, savings banks, real estate and mortgage banks for which annual data (at least three sequential observations) are available during the period 2000-2007. This dataset covers approximately 85% of total banking assets in the emerging and developing countries examined. Macro data is obtained from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank (2008) and International Financial Statistics database. Activity restrictions, capital stringency and supervisory power variables are obtained from Barth et al. (2004) , while the banking freedom and property rights variables are obtained from the Heritage Foundation (2010). Liberalisation index is obtained from Abiad et al. (2010) .
Estimation methods and procedures
The analysis of the relationship of interest follows a structural model proposed by Keeley (1990) . The equations are presented simultaneously as follows:
where the Z it is a proxy for bank stability of bank i in period t, L it is competition measured using the Lerner index, the D it is bank revenue diversification, the variables X i,j are a set of {k} variables controlling for bank-specific characteristics, the respective countries' macroeconomic environments and regulatory variables. α's are the parameter vectors; and ε it are the unobserved disturbances. To account for an endogeneity bias in the model, a three-stage-least-squares (3SLS) simultaneous equation model is used. Stability, competition and revenue diversification are specified as endogenous variables. 3SLS produces estimates from a three-step process: firstly, it develops instrumented values for all endogenous variables; then obtains a consistent estimate for the covariance matrix of the equation disturbances, and finally, performs a GLS-type estimation using the covariance matrix. Furthermore, in the presence of an endogeneity bias and correct specification of structural equation models, the 3SLS produces more consistent and precise estimates of coefficients than those produced by two stage least squares (2SLS) (Deng et al., 2007; Mantecon, 2009) . In addition to the variables and 3SLS discussed, the use of instrumental variables (IV) technique helps to explicitly specify the instruments. Three instruments that are found in the literature to affect competition and banking stability are used: activity restrictions, banking and financial freedom and bank size. Schaeck and Cihak (2010a) use similar instruments with a two stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. Activity restrictions measure the degree to which national authorities allow banks to engage in activities that generate non-interest income. That is, it indicates the limits imposed on commercial banks to participate in securities markets, insurance and real estate activities. The measure varies from 4 to 16 with higher scores indicating more restrictions. The banking freedom variable provides an overall measure of the openness of the banking sector and the extent to which banks are free to operate their businesses. The measure describes a country's financial climate and assigns an overall score between 0 and 100 percent, with a higher percentage score signifying more freedom. Finally, the natural logarithm of total assets is used as a proxy for bank size. Table 1 shows summary statistics for the key variables used in this study. All bank-specific variables are averaged by bank during the period 2000-2007, while that of the country-level variables are averaged by country over the period under study. Within the sample period, the average H-statistic is (0.65) showing that the banking systems of the selected countries are characterised by monopolistic competition. A competitive environment indicator for the selected countries banking systems is presented in Appendix A. H-statistic is employed as a proxy for the degree of competition. The score of H-statistic (with the exception of Burkina Faso and Tanzania) varies between 0.25 and 0.90 meaning that the best description of the degree of competition among selected banks is monopolistic competition. Also, the estimation result provides no strong pattern among the countries sampled. The mean value for the Lerner index in Table 1 is 25%, meaning that banks on average are pricing their products at around 25% above marginal cost. On the measures of overall bank insolvency risk, the sample includes both high and low stable banks. The 15 percentage aggregate equity ratio implies that just less than a sixth of the assets of the selected banks are financed with equity capital. The sample mean of 60% of HHI(rev) and 54% of HHI(non) suggest diversification of bank revenue towards non-interest generating activities. On the pattern of intermediation, on average (51%) of the sample banks' assets are extended as loans. Of the liabilities of the sample banks (79%) constitute core deposits. This means that more than three quarters of emerging countries assets are financed by core deposits. Total asset measures denominated in US dollars is used as a proxy for bank size. The average bank size is $6.86 billion. Profitability of the sample banks is about 1.7% of the assets while the average GDP growth is 5.2% with the consumer price index at 7.7%.
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics
Does revenue diversification affect the competition-stability relationship?
This sub-section analyses the relationship between competition indicators and measures of stability, as well as further investigating whether revenue diversification affects these relationships. Table 2 reports the 3SLS regression results that have as the dependent variables, bank insolvency risk (Z-score) for column 1, risk-adjusted profits (RAROA and RAROE) for column 2 and 3, respectively, capitalisation ratio (equity/assets) for column 4 and loan portfolio risk with the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (bad loans) for column 5. Column 6 uses an alternative measure of revenue diversification (HHIrev). In addition, the table reports the F-statistics which provide a test for the joint significance of the regression coefficients as well as the set of three instruments employed in the regression estimates. Table 2 is also divided into two panels. Panel A presents H-statistic is a measure of competitiveness in the banking sector. The degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index or the price mark-up over marginal cost, with the higher scores indicating a higher degree of pricing power. Z-score (log) is a measure on insolvency risk. Risk adjusted return on assets (RAROA) and of equity (RAROE) measure overall performance. Bank equity represents average capitalization level and is used as a proxy for the degree of risk. Bad loans are a proportion of non-performing loans to total loans. HHI(rev) and HHI(non) measure revenue diversification across interest income and within non-interest income generating activities, respectively. Comm2 is a square of commission income to non-interest income and Non2 is the square of non-interest income to net-operating income. Loans and deposits are ratios of loans to assets and deposits to liabilities, respectively. They measure a bank's portfolio mix. Bank size is the average total assets and ROA measures profitability. GDP growth and inflation are used as measures of economic development.
the main relationship of interest between competition and performance. It also shows the independent effect of competition on bank performance. Panel B on the other hand shows the impact of competition on revenue diversification. As earlier stated, the main argument of this paper is to examine whether or not revenue diversification influences the competition-stability relationship. Panel B shows if this hypothesis holds for the selected sample of banks in developing and emerging economies. That is, Panel B indicates whether or not banks diversify their activities as a result of greater competition. In Panel A of Table 2 , the coefficient of the Lerner index is negative and statistically significant implying that an increase in banking competition has a significant positive effect on the overall stability of banks in emerging and developing markets. 1 This finding corresponds to the 'competition-stability view' in the theoretical literature and is generally consistent with empirical findings of (De Nicolo et al., 2004; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009) -that an increase in the competitiveness of national banking systems increases individual bank financial soundness. However, in contrasts this result supports neither theory (Beck et al., 2006) nor empirical work on the 'competition-fragility view' (Berger et al., 2009 ). Next we analyse the association between our competitive measure and risk-adjusted return on assets (RAROA) and Equity (RAROE). Similarly, the Lerner index has a negative association with both RAROA and RAROE suggesting that banks in emerging countries profit from operating in more competitive banking environments. This finding is also in line with the general concept that competition brings about efficiency and innovation, which reduces costs, and which in turn translates into higher rates of return. This return is in both absolute terms and on a risk-adjusted basis. Column 4 of Table 2 seeks to establish whether banks operating in highly competitive banking markets hold more equity capital. Banks hold equity capital as a cushion to absorb any losses emanating from their operations. The literature is inconclusive on the effect of the degree of competition on equity capital holding. While Berger et al. (2009) findings suggest that bank capitalisation levels are high for banks with higher market power, Schaeck and Cihak (2010a) find the opposite, that competition provides incentives for banks to maintain higher capital ratios. Our results provide significant evidence to support the fact that a banking system structure explains the capitalisation level of banks in emerging and developing countries. The coefficient is negative indicating that banks in emerging and developing markets maintain a higher capital ratio Table shows the Three stage least squares (3SLS) regression results of bank insolvency risk using alternative measures of market structure. The dependant variables for panel A are measures of bank overall risk: Z-score (log), RAROA, RAROE, Equity/assets, and Bad loans ratio and dependent variable for panel B are measures of revenue diversification: HHI(non) and HHI(rev). These are regressed on selected explanatory variables: the degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index or the price mark-up over marginal cost, with higher scores indicating a higher degree of pricing power. HHI(rev) and HHI(non) measure revenue diversification across interest income and within non-interest income generating activities, respectively. Non-income2 is the square of non-interest income to net operating income. Loans and deposits are ratios of loans to assets and deposits to liabilities, respectively. Com-income2 is a square of commission income to non-interest income. Ratio of securities/assets is measured as total investment in securities divided by total assets. The regressions use instruments for Lerner index and the instruments used are (1) activity restrictions, an index of regulatory restriction on bank activities; (2) banking freedom provides overall measures of the openness of the banking sector and (3) natural logarithm of total assets in millions of US$ (size). The dependent variables and the measures of competitive structure are treated as endogenous. The parameters are estimated with the small sample adjusted standard errors in parenthesis. p-Value of F-test takes into account the significance of identifying instruments. * Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
as the competition level increases. 2 Regarding the relationship between the Lerner index and loan portfolio risk (bad loans), the result is positive and significant. This means that a high degree of competition, ceteris paribus, is linked to low loan losses as a proportion of total loans. In an environment where banking competition is high, bank interest rates are generally low, borrowers return on investment increases which in turn decrease the risk of default and consequently non-performing loans will be lower. Furthermore, a low cost of capital also enables borrowers to increase their return on capital, increase cashflow from investment and thus be able to service their bank loans. This finding is consistent with the 'competition-stability view' of (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005) that greater bank competition is associated with low loan losses.
Bank funding structure (deposit/liabilities) and that of lending (loan/assets) are found to have an impact on bank insolvency risk. Banks depending on wholesale funding have been severely affected during the current financial crisis while those in Australia and Canada for example have been more resilient to the crisis because they rely mostly on depository funding (OECD, 2010). These two bank-specific variables are controlled and reported in Panel A of Table 2 . The coefficient of loan/assets is positive on both insolvency risk and profitability but negative on capitalization and loan portfolio risk. This means that bank lending in developing countries is associated with a decrease in capitalization ratio, lower loan portfolio risk, and higher performance and therefore an increase in the financial soundness of banks. Intuitively, banks that provide quality loans hold low levels of capital and consequently do not need additional capital to absorb losses. Furthermore, the profitability level of such banks is enhanced because low provisions are made in connection to loan losses. The result provides no evidence of negative consequences of depository funding of banks in developing countries. Growth in GDP improves profitability and reduces the nonperforming loan ratio. The relationship between competition and stability as reported in Table 2 is well established in the banking literature. The ambiguity lies between the channels of instability. In order to further analyse whether or not competition affects insolvency risk through diversification, there has to be an independent effect of competition on diversification. That is, the extent to which high levels of competition impact on diversification. This means that the Lerner index must influence HHI(non) and HHI(rev) significantly.
Using Eqs. (8) and (9), the regression results in Panel B are simultaneously estimated with those in Panel A. In Table 2 the coefficient for Lerner index reported in Panel B is positive and statistically significant across all specifications. The same results are obtained when HHI(rev), an alternative measure of revenue diversification is used in column 6. These results imply that competition exerts pressure on banks in emerging/developing economies to diversify both across and within non-interest income generating activities. 3 The results also show that banks prefer to diversify within the market they already operate in compared to a new market. This is because the coefficient of the impact of competition on HHI(non) is relatively larger than that of HHI(rev). Again, it could be a precautionary strategy as banks take into account risk of entering into a new market. Similar results are reported when H-statistic an alternative measure of the degree of competition is used in Table 3 . Thus, Panel B of both Tables 2 and 3 confirm that the degree of competition has an independent effect on diversification. In a nutshell, the results of Tables 2 and 3 provide empirically, an additional channel (revenue diversification) through which competition affects insolvency risk of banks in developing and emerging markets. In addition to the regression results reported in Table 2 and HHI(rev). These are regressed on selected explanatory variables: H-statistic is a measure of competitiveness in the banking sector as discussed in Section 3.1. HHI(rev) and HHI(non) measure revenue diversification across interest income and within non-interest income generating activities, respectively. Non-income2 is the square of non-interest income to net-operating income. Loans and deposits are ratios of loan to assets and deposits to liabilities, respectively. Com-income2 is a square of commission income to non-interest income. ROA is return on assets and it measures profitability. The regressions use instruments for H-statistics and the instruments used are (1) activity restrictions, an index of regulatory restriction on bank activities; (2) banking freedom provide overall measures of the openness of the banking sector and (3) natural logarithm of total assets in millions of US$ (size). The dependent variables and the measures of competitive structure are treated as endogenous. The parameters are estimated with the small sample adjusted standard errors in parenthesis. p-Value of F-test takes into account the significance of identifying instruments. * Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
depicts the level of revenue diversification (HHInon) during the period, while Fig. 3 illustrates the level of insolvency risk, measured using (Z-score). The chart in Fig. 4 represents the profitability of the sample banks measured by RAROA. Both Fig. 1 (Lerner index) and 2 (HHInon) depict the same trend over the sample period. Increasing at the initial period until 2004 and falling thereafter. A similar pattern is shown in Figs. 3 and 4 in respect to insolvency risk and profitability. Greater bank competition is associated with higher revenue diversification, greater bank solvency and higher profitability. The degree of competition among banks at the early part of 2000s is low and this corresponds with the level of diversification during that period. However, during 2004 However, during -2007 , when the competitive environment of emerging/developing economies increases, diversification and stability increase, supporting the assertion that competition by no small means exerts pressure on banks to Table presents the regression results of bank risk: IV estimation The dependant variables are measures of overall risk: Z-score (log), RAROA, RAROE, and Bad loans ratio. These are regressed on selected explanatory variables: H-statistic is a measure of competitiveness in the banking sector as discussed in Section 3.1. HHI(rev) and HHI(non) measure revenue diversification across interest income and within non-interest income generating activities, respectively. Non-income2 is the square of non-interest income to net-operating income. Loans and deposits are ratios of loans to assets and deposits to liabilities, respectively. GDP growth measures business cycle fluctuation. Inflation is the rate of inflation based on the CPI. The degree of market power is proxied by the Lerner Index or the price mark-up over marginal cost, with the higher scores indicating a higher degree of pricing power. The regression for column (1), (2), (3), (4) and (6) use instruments for H-statistics and regression for column (5) employ instruments for Lerner index. The instruments used for specification are 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 are (1) activity restrictions, which is an index of regulatory restriction on bank activities; (2) banking freedom provides overall measures of the openness of the banking sector and (3) natural logarithm of total assets in millions of US$ (size), while in specification 2, the activity restriction is dropped and replace with entry restriction. The parameters are estimated with the small sample adjusted standard errors in parenthesis. Panel B reports diagnostic test: two tests (Sargan N × R 2 and Basmann test) are reported for overidentifying restrictions measures instruments exogeneity. The R 2 measures the goodness of fit while the p-value of F-test measures the significance of identifying instruments. The Wu-Hausman F-test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi 2 specification compare the difference between the IV and the OLS estimators. Regression column 6 is exactly identified and thus has 0.000 for both Sargan N × R sq and Basmann test. Bank and country fixed effects are excluded from the estimation. * Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Statistical significance at the 1% level. H-statistic is a measure of competitiveness in the banking sector as discussed in Section 3.1. HHI(non) measures revenue diversification within non-interest income generating activities. Non-income2 is the square of non-interest income to net-operating income. Loans and deposits are ratios of loan to assets and deposits to liabilities, respectively. Four regulatory and supervisory variables are included in the baseline regression: financial reforms, supervisory power, property rights and capital index. Higher values of financial reform indicate fully reformed. Supervisory power measures whether the authorities have the power to take specific action to correct and prevent problems. It also ranges from 0 to 16 with higher values indicating more supervisory power. Higher scores of property rights indicate certainty of legal protection of property rights and limited expropriation risks. Capital index measures overall capital stringency. It ranges from 0 to 9, with a higher value indicating greater stringency. The regressions use instruments for H-statistic and the instruments used are (1) activity restrictions which is an index of regulatory restriction on bank activities; (2) banking freedom provides overall measures of the openness of the banking sector and (3) natural logarithm of total assets in millions of US$ (size). The dependent variables and the measures of competitive structure are treated as endogenous. The parameters are estimated with the small sample adjusted standard errors in parenthesis. Country and bank fixed effects are not included in the estimates. * Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
diversify their activities and this enables them to reduce their insolvency risk. Table 3 presents the relationship between competition, revenue diversification and bank insolvency risk using alternative measures of competition. H-statistic is based on a reduced-form revenue equation, the so called Here, the H-statistic is used to check the robustness of the earlier findings. The results are similar to results using Lerner index as reported in Table 2 . Even though the sign and the level of significance are the same, the magnitudes of the coefficients are slightly different. The high degree of competition in developing countries, ceteris paribus, reduces bank insolvency risk and risk in the loan portfolio, while increasing profitability, and the holding of more equity capital.
Alternative measures of market structure and methodological specification
Next is the analysis of the relationship of interest between competition and bank stability using two stage least squares (2SLS) regression. Even though the use of 2SLS regression does not necessarily need an explicit specification of the baseline equation ((8) and (9)), the competitive measures (H-statistic and Lerner index), insolvency risk (Z-score) and revenue diversification (HHInon or HHIrev) are still treated as endogenous. The same sets of three instruments are used as discussed in Section 3.3. In addition, 2SLS is used so that diagnostic tests can be conducted to assess the fit of the model in a single equation setting. The results are presented in Table 4 and are similar to that reported in Tables 2 and 3 . The direction of the sign and the significance of the coefficients remain the same. The only difference between the results reported in Tables 2 and 3  and that of Table 4 is the standard error. The standard error of 2SLS is relatively larger than those produce in Tables 2 and 3 using 3SLS. This finding supports the earlier argument that 3SLS yields more precise and consistent estimates than 2SLS. The use of these two estimation techniques shows that greater bank competition increases stability with higher level of diversification. The results of bank-specific and macroeconomic control variables remain unchanged.
Furthermore, the use of 2SLS allows for several diagnostic tests to be carried out. Two tests, Sargan N*R 2 and Basmann chi-squared tests are reported for over-identification restriction measures of instruments exogeneity. The result rejects the 4 Panzar and Rosse (1987) define a measure of competition, the Has the sum of the elasticities of the reduced-form revenue function with respect to factor prices. They show that this statistic can reflect the structure and the conduct of the market to which the firm belongs; it represents the percentage variation of the equilibrium revenue derived from the unit percent increase in price of all factors used by the firm. His an increasing function of the demand elasticity e, that is, the less market power is exercised on the part of banks, the higher Hbecomes. It is calculated as the sum of the elasticities of the total interest income with respect to the three input price of deposit funds, labour and capital and these are respectively calculated as the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and money market funds, labour cost to total assets, and other operating expenses to total assets. We test for equilibrium in all the sample countries and find that the banking industries of most countries are in 'equilibrium' (not reported).
alternative hypothesis that the instruments are correlated with the error term in column 1, 4, 5, and 6. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the unobserved term. The R 2 measures the goodness of fit while the p-value of the F-test takes into account the significance of instruments. The Wu-Hausman F-test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi 2 specification compare the difference between the use of instrumental variables (IV) and ordinary least squares (OLS). In sum, the results using 2SLS estimating techniques show that competition improves the financial soundness of banks that diversify their activities.
Financial reforms, supervisory and regulatory controls
Financial liberalisation, regulatory and institutional environments impact on banking sector competition. For instance regulatory measures such as lower barriers to entry and fewer restrictions on bank activities have been found to improve systemic stability (Beck et al., 2006) . Regressions in Table 5 examine the impact of bank overall risk (Z-score) while controlling additionally for a financial liberalisation index (financial reforms), regulatory and institutional variables (capital stringency and supervision power) and risk of expropriation (property right). 3SLS regression is used as an estimator and to address collinearity problems, the additional variables enter into the regression one at a time. Even when financial reforms, supervision power, property rights and capital stringency index are controlled, the results suggest that greater banking competition and revenue diversification remain positively associated with bank stability. Table 5 also reports the results including financial reforms as an additional control variable. The coefficient is positive and significant implying that developing economies that have a banking system fully reformed will increase stability. The coefficient on the supervision power is negative, that of property rights and capital stringency are positive. Legal protection on private property and the judicial efficiency in enforcing these laws increase stability. The results also highlight the effectiveness of capital regulation in reducing risk-taking.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature by analysing how revenue diversification of banks in developing and emerging economies affects the relationship between competition and stability. Different risk exposure indicators are used as dependent variables to proxy for bank stability: the Z-score as a measure of overall bank risk, the risk adjusted profit as a measure of profitability, the volume of non-performing loans to total gross loans is used to measure bank loan portfolio risk, and the equity capital to asset ratio to account for the level of bank capitalization. To account for simultaneity and address endogeneity, and to provide precise and consistent parameter estimates, 3SLS regression estimates are used. Furthermore, we employ 2sls as a robustness test.
The results show a positive and significant relationship between competition and stability. More importantly, this positive and significant relationship holds when risk adjusted profits are used as the dependent variable. This means that greater competition in a banking sector enhances stability. On competition and bank capitalization, the results show that diversified banks that operate in a competitive environment tend to hold relatively more equity capital though the result is relatively insignificant. Our results also show that a competitive and diversified banking system is associated with less risky loan portfolios. Similar results are found when alternative measures of the degree of competition and different methodological specifications are employed. Even when financial reforms, supervisory power, property rights, capital stringency index and macroeconomic variables are controlled, the results suggest that competition and revenue diversification remain positively associated with bank stability. The core finding is that competition increases stability as bank diversification across and within both interest and non-interest income generating activities increases. Furthermore, our analysis identifies a channel through which competition affects bank insolvency risk in developing/emerging markets. The results also comply with the 'competition-stability view' in the theoretical literature and are generally consistent with prior empirical findings that banks that operate in an uncompetitive banking industry are prone to originating riskier loans which are detrimental to their stability.
Finally, our results provide additional evidence for the current debate on whether or not competition improves stability. This paper provides valuable insights for regulatory authorities, banking supervisors and market participants about the role of diversification in competition and stability relationships. In conclusion, the findings provide no evidence to support regulatory initiative that restricts both banking sector competition and diversification activities.
This section presents H-statistics for the banking system of the selected countries. Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic is calculated as the average of implied H-statistics from four different structural models estimated for each country for the eight year-period; 2000-2007 and is based on the Claessens and Laeven (2004) approach. H1 is estimated using pooled OLS with bank-specific and time dummies and gross interest income as dependent variable in the reduced-form revenue equation. H2 is estimated using pooled GLS with time dummies and gross interest income as dependent variable in the reducedform revenue equation. H3 is estimated using pooled OLS with bank-specific and time dummies and total income as dependent variable in the reduced-form revenue equation. H4 is estimated using pooled GLS with time dummies and gross interest income as dependent variable in the reduced-form revenue equation. The data comprises of 978 banks across 55 countries over the period 2000-2007. 
